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Abstract
The approaches to constitutional interpretation of Pro-
fessors Akhil Amar and Philip Bobbitt provide a window 
into the field of the American legal debate. This paper of-
fers an analysis of the jurisprudence of two of the great-
est constitutional scholars of our days, confronted in two 
axis of significant value for scholars: who should interpret 
and what should be interpreted. In determining the 
range of authoritative interpretation in the judiciary and 
beyond, and limiting the body of materials available for 
interpreters in remarkably different ways, these scholars 
provide a wide and precise picture of the constitutional 
landscape while also indicating how radically different 
approaches to interpretation may pursue the same prin-
cipled ends.
Keywords: constitutional interpretation; catholic; prot-
estant; faith; indeterminacy.
Resumo
As abordagens dos Professores Akhil Amar e Philip Bobbitt 
quanto à interpretação constitucional oferecem uma jane-
la para o campo do debate jurídico americano. Esse artigo 
apresenta uma análise da doutrina de dois dos maiores 
juristas do direito constitucional de seu tempo, confrontan-
do-se em dois eixos de valor significativo para estudiosos: 
quem deve interpretar e o que deve ser interpretado. Ao 
determinar o alcance da interpretação válida no judiciário 
e além, e limitar o conjunto de materiais disponíveis para 
os intérpretes de formas notadamente distintas, esses juris-
tas oferecem uma visão ampla e precisa do cenário cons-
titucional, ao mesmo tempo em que demonstram como 
abordagens radicalmente distintas quanto à interpretação 
podem aspirar principiologicamente aos mesmos fins.
Palavras-chave: interpretação constitucional; católico; 
protestante; fé; indeterminação.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 3, n. 2, p. 33-50, maio/ago. 2016.
Ana Beatriz Vanzoff Robalinho Cavalcanti
34 
CONTENTS
1. Introduction; 2. The influence of faith in law: catholic and protestant approaches to constitutional 
interpretation; 3. Reversing misconceptions; 3.1. Bobbitt as an interpretative Protestant: language and 
conscience; 3.2. Amar as an interpretative catholic: America’s unwritten Constitution; 4. Faith in the Con-
stitution and the coherence of purist theories; 5. Conclusion; 6. References. 
Interpretation is not an occasional, post facto supplement to understanding; rather, 
understanding is always interpretation, and hence interpretation is the explicit form of 
understanding.1
1. INTRODUCTION
The issue of constitutional interpretation has been in the center of legal debate 
in America for the better part of the 20th century (and all the lived part of the 21st). A 
significant number of the great legal minds of the last eighty years have dedicated time 
and effort to the question of interpretation, and offered answers that range on both ex-
tremes of the political spectrum and to all corners of legal possibility. The jurisprudenc-
es of Professors Philip Bobbitt and Akhil Amar both fall under this extremely wide um-
brella but, as was to be expected when accounted differences in formation, historical 
context and opinion, offer very different approaches to constitutional interpretation. 
This difference must be understood, foremost, on time frame. Over twenty years 
stand between the publication of Professor Bobbitt’s first book on interpretation, Con-
stitutional Fate2, and Professor Amar’s America’s Constitution: A Biography3. Both Profes-
sors have, naturally, published before and since on the issue of interpretation. But the 
decades the set apart these larger projects of constitutional solutions must be under-
stood in a legal, historical and political time frame. When Bobbitt wrote Constitutional 
Fate in the late 1970s, the great question of American Constitutional Law was judicial 
review. By then the progressive decisions of the Warren and early Burger Courts had 
left a profound mark of the political and legal spectrum, and jurists on the left and 
right alike turned to such decisions in producing scholarship designed to either jus-
tify their fundaments and scope or definitely rebuff them as unauthorized violations 
of the constitutional order4. The second decade of the 21st century, on the other hand, 
1  GADAMER, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
2  BOBBITT, Philip. Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.
3  AMAR, Akhil Reed. America’s constitution: a biography. New York: Random House, 2006.
4  The on-going constitutional debate that sprung from this particular historical period is worthy of note. On 
the right, one of the great critical instruments in this period was democracy. The counter-majoritarian difficulty 
of judicial review (See BERGER, Raoul. Government by judiciary. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997), arguing 
that judicial review of legislation - approved by a democratically elected Congress - by a group of unelect-
ed judges impaired the democratic principle and threatened the liberty of the American people.) became a 
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was inaugurated in a new era of the realm of constitutional theory. The dilemma of 
judicial review, although far from the resolved in the minds of respectable constitu-
tional scholars, has been largely placed aside in the pursue of new challenges5. The 
approach to constitutional interpretation has been dissociated, albeit incompletely, 
from the context of courts in contemporary legal scholarship6. In this new context of 
scholarly debate, it is notable how often the exercise of interpretation, as repeatedly 
seen in Professor Amar’s books, is entirely independent from the interpretative efforts 
of the Supreme Court7. 
Understanding that these scholarly enterprises are products of different times, 
and even to some extent designed to answer different questions does not, however, 
invalidate or preclude a comparative effort between them. In fact, the richness of the 
ideas presented in the works of both authors and the functional value of the solutions 
they offer makes such comparative enterprises a timeless exercise. In this paper I utilize 
a useful analogy in illuminating the differences and similarities between these dispa-
rate approaches to constitutional interpretation; in the process, I hope to clarify both 
weapon in the hands of opponents of the progressive Supreme Court of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. The great her-
itage of the right of this period, in the realm of constitutional interpretation, is originalism as defended by men 
like Robert Bork (see BORK, Robert H. The Tempting of America. New York: Free Press, 1997) and Edwin Meese. 
The left, of course, was not silent; but it was, perhaps, less united in its approach to judicial review. Theories of 
interpretation justifying the use of judicial review, especially in the protection of civil rights, were presented by 
progressive law professors who wished to legitimate the legacy of the Warren Court (See BICKEL, Alexander. 
The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court At The Bar Of Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1986; FISS, Owen M.. Objectivity and Interpretation. Stanford Law Review, San Francisco, 34, p. 739–763, 1982; 
ELY, John Hart. Democracy And Distrust: A Theory Of Judicial Review. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1980). But the left also turned on itself as scholars of the Critical Legal Studies movement sought to decon-
struct justifying legal theories – including the ones that supported their own political preferences. See UNGER, 
Roberto Mangabeira. The Critical Legal Studies Movement: Another Time, A Greater Task. London: Verso, 
2015; TUSHNET, Mark V. Red, White, And Blue: A Critical Analysis Of Constitutional Law. Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2015. Reva Siegel and Robert Post have suggested that this united theoretical front on the 
right – not replicated on the left – can account for the remarkable influence originalism practiced by right wing 
has exerted in America in the last decades. See SIEGEL, Reva; POST, Robert. Democratic Constitutionalism. In: 
The Constitution in 2020. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Most of these remarkable changes in the 
field of constitutional interpretation have taken place precisely in the period that separates Constitutional Fate 
and America’s Constitution: A Biography. And they will be shown to have a significant influence in the ideolog-
ical differences in between Amar’s and Bobbitt’s approaches to interpretation.
5  See BALKIN, Jack M., Critical Legal Theory Today, Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2008.
6  New approaches to constitutional interpretation focus on the power of social and political movements in 
shaping constitutional meaning inside and outside of courts, rather than the reasoning of judges. See BALKIN, 
Jack M., Living Originalism. [s.l.]: Belknap Press, 2014. See also ACKERMAN, Bruce, The Living Constitution, 
Harvard Law Review, v. 120, n. 7, p. 1737–1812, 2007. POST, Robert; SIEGEL, Reva, Roe Rage: Democratic Con-
stitutionalism and Backlash, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, v. 42, p. 373, 2007.
7  In discussing matters such as abortion and the use of contraceptives, Professor Amar engages in demon-
strating how the 14th and 19th amendments have provided the Constitution with new standarts of equality 
for women that necessarily translate in new approaches to matters such as sexuality and child bearing in the 
United States. In doing so, he does not engage with the argumentative line utilized by the Supreme Court to 
resolve the same line of cases, in which a doctrine of privacy rights was created from the concepts of liberty 
and due process. AMAR, Akhil Reed. America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We 
Live By, Reprint edition. [s.l.]: Basic Books, 2015. p. 277.
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how these authors speak to each other and to other scholars engaged in the debate of 
constitutional interpretation. For such, in Part I I will present the analogical tools devel-
oped in the work of Professor Sanford Levinson8 and elaborate my hypothesis of how 
they apply to the works of Professors Amar and Bobbitt; in Part II, I will attempt to ad-
dress some possible problems and questions my hypothesis generates, and in Part III 
I will explore the consequences of the ideological and normative differences between 
the author’s theories, and what I believe brings them together.
2. THE INFLUENCE OF FAITH IN LAW: CATHOLIC AND PROTES-
TANT APPROACHES TO CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
In 1987, Professor Sanford Levinson published Constitutional Faith9, an explor-
atory work of law and political theory that sought to illuminate nuances of theory and 
practice in these fields by the means of analogies between law and religion. One of the 
most fascinating features of this enterprise were the analogical standards offered in the 
comparison of the different approaches to constitutional interpretation, derived from 
Christian approaches to the interpretation of the bible. Levinson sough to explain how 
Catholics and Protestants differed on both the sources of authority and the basis of 
interpretation for biblical teachings; while the catholic tradition developed throughout 
the centuries a doctrinal support to the biblical text, derived from the “independent 
authority of oral tradition”, Protestantism sought to reinstate the bible as the one true 
source of God’s authoritative power. And whereas in Catholic tradition the church was 
the one true source of interpretative authority, Protestantism wished to vindicate the 
power of individual conscience, allowing every man to interpret the sacred text in the 
search of guidance for spiritualism and behavior.
In the realm of constitutional interpretation, Levinson devised two variables: (a) 
reliance solely on the text of the constitution as a source of authority in which to base 
interpretation or (b) understanding doctrine, or unwritten traditions, to be sources of 
constitutional law along with the written text; and (c) understanding an institutional 
authority (in this case the Supreme Court) as the ultimate dispenser of interpretative 
power or (d) recognizing the legitimacy of individualized (“or at least nonhierarquical 
communal”) interpretation. He stresses that there is “no logical connection between 
Constitution-identity and who is to be the authorized interpreter of the Constitution”10, 
signaling that one could position oneself as a Catholic in regards to one of the variables 
and as Protestant to the other. 
8  LEVINSON, Sanford, Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011.
9  LEVINSON, Sanford, Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011.
10  LEVINSON, Sanford, Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011. p. 29.
Coherence and faith: constitutional interpretation by Akhil Amar and Philip Bobbitt
37Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 3, n. 2, p. 33-50, maio/ago. 2016.
In fact, Professor Levinson then goes to show how different constitutional schol-
ars have often chosen opposite sides of the spectrum in each of the variables, just as 
others have stayed “pure” in their Catholic or Protestant approaches. However, I must 
state a point of disagreement with Professor Levinson (himself self-declaredly a man of 
“split” preferences11) as to the inexistence of any logical connection in between the sub-
stantive basis for interpretation and the source of interpretative authority, for I believe 
such a basis exists – and moreover, that while it does not impede the reality of accept-
able split theories, it endows purists with a greater sense of coherence and functional 
value, an argument I intent to explore throughout this paper.
That being said, it is necessary to disclosure that the best way of reading the 
variables proposed by Levinson is as ideal types, as suggested by Professor Amar when 
engaging in a similar exercise12. Therefore, even amongst those who would align their 
interpretative preferences with the same strain of religious analogy on both variables, 
dissimilarities are natural and do not disparage the fundamental differentiation of the 
analysis. As noted by Professor Amar:
The difference lies in emphasis and attitude. Those who privilege the document do not 
ignore precedent altogether. (How could they, given that the text itself suggests a role 
for judicial exposition?) Conversely, those who privilege precedent concede that the text 
does sometimes matter - on rare occasions, they have even been caught reading the 
Constitution. (Hasn’t the Court itself suggested that constitutional precedents must often 
yield if later adjudged contrary to the document?) In some sense, we are all documentar-
ians; we are all doctrinalists.13
Such dissimilarities will be noticed in all of the examples, provided by Profes-
sor Levinson and elsewhere, of how interpretative theories have applied each of the 
variables in the ideal types. And in those examples, interestingly enough, split theories 
are more common than pure ones. Levinson’s primary example of a pure textualist of 
the Protestant variety is Justice Hugo Black (who was also described as the champi-
on of textual argument by Professor Bobbitt in Constitutional Fate14), who apart from 
11  As noted by Professor Amar in AMAR, Akhil Reed. Civil Religion and Its Discontents. Tex. L. Rev., v.  67, 
p. 1153–1591, 1989, p. 1155.
12  In comparing doctrinalists and documentarians, two categories of constitutional interpreters that speak to 
the first of Professor Levinson’s variables. See AMAR, Akhil Reed. The Document and the Doctrine. Harvard Law 
Review, v. 114, 2000, p. 27.
13  AMAR, Akhil Reed. The Document and the Doctrine. Harvard Law Review, v. 114, 2000.
14  Professor Bobbitt explains textualism as developed by Black stating that: “Black developed the textual argu-
ment, and a set of supporting doctrines, with a simplicity and power they had never before had. His view was 
that the Constitution has a certain number of significant prohibitions which, when phrased without qualifica-
tion, bar any extension of governmental power into the prohibited areas. A judge need not decide whether 
such an extension is wise or prudent; and as such a non-decider, he is a mere conduit for the prohibitions of the 
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defending the text of the Constitution as the only source of interpretative substance 
did not challenge judicial authority, causing Levinson to label him “protestant-catho-
lic”. On the category of doctrinalists, or Catholics as to what actually constituted “the 
Constitution”, the most notorious candidate suggested by Levinson is Ronald Dworkin, 
whose work is famous for advocating morality as a source of constitutional principles, 
and also for the figure of Hercules, or the ideal judge15. Levinson notes, however, that 
“Hercules could just as easily be an ordinary citizen as a justice of the United States 
Supreme Court. All that Dworkin requires is that this adjudicator be someone seriously 
committed to the Constitution (…)”16.  
Dworkin and Black are striking examples because they are extremely commit-
ted to their respective ends on the first variable, but do not remain within the same 
“category” in regards to who has interpretative authority over the Constitution. Other 
examples follow this pattern. In his own analysis of doctrinalists and documentarians, 
Professor Amar points to John Hart Ely as a documentarian, or a Protestant of the first 
variety; but Ely is not a critic of judicial supremacy. In fact, his theory was designed to 
justify the exercise of judicial review within a structural framework17. 
Nevertheless, there are obviously some purists to be found in the legal realm. 
One example (by both Amar and Levinson) is Justice John Marshall Harlan, a commit-
ted doctrinalist or Catholic (of both varieties). Harlan advocated the role of tradition 
as a valid source of constitutional law, while reaffirming the supreme authority of the 
Court to recognize the meaning of the Constitution informed by it. The other purist 
presented by Professor Levinson, in true Protestant fashion, was neither a judge nor 
even a lawyer, but Frederick Douglass, a slave-turned-abolitionist that rejected both 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution about slavery and widespread 
tradition as a source of doctrinal authority. Douglass emphasized the textual character 
of the Constitution, but radically denied the supremacy of the Supreme Court as an in-
terpreter18, once he believed its interpretations were not based in the only true source 
of substantive authority, the constitutional text.
The question that remains is how do the works of Professors Amar and Bobbitt 
fit into the framework suggested by Levinson. Let us first examine the variable that 
Professor Amar himself proposed to divide documentarians and doctrinalists. In such 
Constitution”. BOBBITT, Philip. Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1984. p. 31.
15  DWORKIN, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
16  LEVINSON, Sanford, Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011. p. 42.
17  ELY, John Hart, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1980.
18  LEVINSON, Sanford, Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011. p. 51.
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a framework, Professor Amar is a self-declared documentarian first and doctrinalist 
second19. By this he means that he seeks “inspiration and discipline in the amended 
Constitution’s specific words and word patterns, the historical experiences that birthed 
and rebirthed the text, and the conceptual schemas and structures organizing the 
document.”20 To the extent that Protestantism is understood as an ideal type, Professor 
Amar is most definitely Protestant, willing to “wring every drop of possible meaning 
from constitutional text, history and structure…”21 before ever resorting to sources of 
doctrine.
Professor Bobbitt has a clearly different approach. He clearly and repeatedly 
states that in his theory the different modalities of argument have no hierarchy be-
tween them22. He does not favor doctrine over text, as so many interpretative Catholics 
do. In fact, he is willing to insist that the interpretative results using any of the mo-
dalities is equally legitimate, and therefore recognizes the authority of sources such a 
precedents (doctrinal argument) and ethos (ethical argument). This suffices in charac-
terizing him as someone who recognized the independent authority of tradition, to use 
Levinson’s terms23, and therefore a Catholic.
The second variable is more fluid and harder to determine. As Levinson notes 
on religious grounds, it certainly cannot be that Protestantism rejects all church author-
ity. Instead, what exists is “a strong push to a radically deinstitutionalized relationship 
between the individual believer and the God revealed in scripture”24, and therefore “it is 
up to each member of the faith community who feels touched by God’s saving grace to 
decide what the Word actually requires”25. In law, this relationship between individual 
and institutionalized authority is even subtler. 
Back to ideal types, it is not the case that Protestants refuse to recognize the 
authority of the Supreme Court as an interpreter of the Constitution, not that Catho-
lics are absolutely court-centered. But to the extent that differences exist, they will be 
noticed in emphasis and, I shall argue, a general coherence with the substantive basis 
of a theory of interpretation. Protestants of the second variety may be more willing 
to recognize individual or nonhierarchical interpretations against the Supreme Court. 
Levinson cites as examples of this President Andrew Jackson and Attorney General Ed-
win Meese, both public figures vested in authority, but that actively proclaimed to have 
19  AMAR, Akhil Reed. The Document and the Doctrine. Harvard Law Review, v. 114, 2000. p. 27.
20  AMAR, Akhil Reed. The Document and the Doctrine. Harvard Law Review, v. 114, 2000. p. 26.
21  AMAR, Akhil Reed. The Document and the Doctrine. Harvard Law Review, v. 114, 2000.
22  See BOBBITT, Philip C. Constitutional Interpretation. Cambridge: Blackwell Pub, 1991. See also BOBBITT, 
Philip. Reflections Inspired by My Critics. Texas Law Review, v. 72, 1993.
23  LEVINSON, Sanford, Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011. p. 23.
24  LEVINSON, Sanford, Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011. p. 25.
25  LEVINSON, Sanford, Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011. p. 25–26.
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equal authority to the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution. In 
describing the episode of President Jackson’s veto of the Second Bank, Professor Amar 
has quoted him expressing that “the Congress, the executive, and the court must each 
for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution…the opinion of the judges 
has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over judges; and 
on that point the President is independent of both.”26
Catholics in this variety are easier: they believe the Supreme Court has the ulti-
mate authority to interpret the Constitution, and while other actors in the polity may 
disagree and engage in debate on constitutional matters, only the Court’s interpreta-
tion is a source of legitimate authority. In this sense, I will argue that Professor Bobbitt’s 
theoretical framework is consistent with a Catholic approach on the second variety, 
while Professor Amar’s is consistent with a Protestant approach. That would make both 
Professors purists in Levinson’s proposed varieties, on opposite sides of his spectrum: 
Amar would be “protestant-protestant” and Bobbitt “catholic-catholic”.
This is a large claim, and I want to break it into three fragments, which will be 
explored in the next parts of this paper. For now I will state the features of Professors 
Amar and Bobbitt’s theories that seem to be consistent with my proposed classification 
of their work on Levinson’s second variety. In Part II I will address the qualities of their 
work that seem inconsistent with my proposed classification on both varieties, and try 
to assess whether they undermine it. Then in Part III I will return to the effects and con-
sequences of this classification in comparing the Professor’s works.
Classifying Professor Bobbitt as a Catholic as to who has the authority to inter-
pret the Constitution goes back to the very purpose of his work. In Constitutional Fate, 
and again in introducing Constitutional Interpretation, Professor Bobbitt proclaims to be 
analyzing the legitimacy (in Constitutional Fate) and justification (in Constitutional Inter-
pretation) of judicial review. His work is designed to explain why constitutional inter-
pretation performed by judges is legitimate, and why a system in which constitutional 
interpretation is performed by judges is just. His is not a work that proposes to change 
the system, or to disclaim it: in this sense it is redemptive27 because it seeks to explain 
how and why the system works, and can continue to work.
Professor Amar’s work is redemptive in a different way. He pays considerably 
less attention to judicial review, while stressing on several points severe disagreement 
with the interpretations provided by the Supreme Court on constitutional provisions. 
If, however, his work is critical, his criticism is directed at the Supreme Court and not 
26  AMAR, Akhil Reed. America’s constitution: a biography. New York: Random House, 2006. p. 185.
27  The extent to which theories of law can be redemptive, and how they relate to the idea of faith in the 
Constitution (however one understands the Constitution to be) is lenthly explored by Professsor Jack Balkin 
in BALKIN, Jack M. Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2011.
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at the Constitution. Just as Frederick Douglass (as he is described by Levinson)28, he 
can assert the legitimacy of an interpretation that is contrary both to existing traditions 
and to the interpretation provided by the Supreme Court. Professor Amar’s faith in the 
Constitution (to use another fundamental expression in Levinson’s work) is much more 
related to the Founding Document as he understands it and interprets it than to how 
the United States Supreme Court has shaped it.
I now turn to the (several) questions raised by my proposed classifications, as I 
aim to deepen my analysis of Professors Bobbitt and Amar’s theories of constitutional 
interpretation.
3. REVERSING MISCONCEPTIONS
The claims I am making in classifying the interpretative theories of Professors 
Bobbitt and Amar can and have been challenged not only by the authors themselves, 
but also by others that have studied their work. Without presuming to sum or ade-
quately respond to every strain of criticism, in this part I hope to address some mislead-
ing features of their work, which could lead us to assume, in a first analysis, the presence 
of Protestantism or Catholicism where in reality there is none.
3.1. Bobbitt as an interpretative Protestant: language and conscience
In reviewing Constitutional Interpretation in 1993, Professor Levinson himself 
(writing with Professor Jack Balkin) has declared that Professor Bobbitt was “deeply 
protestant in his approach to constitutionalism and constitutional interpretation”29. 
This statement was produced in the caracterization of Professor Bobbitt by his review-
ers as a constitutional grammarian, someone invested in a project to determine the 
rules of the constitutional language game and, therefore, allow all actors in the system 
to play and excel on it. According to Levinson and Balkin:
Bobbitt wishes to empower all the members of the legal system, including not only judg-
es but also legislators, executive officials, and especially laypersons, to engage in consti-
tutional interpretation. To this end, Constitutional Interpretation is offered basically as 
a primer that will quickly teach ordinary citizens how to interpret the U.S. Constitution. 
Even if they know nothing of constitutional doctrine or the specifics of constitutional 
history, they can still participate in the practice of constitutional interpretation because 
they can make textual, structural, ethical, and prudential arguments.30
28  LEVINSON, Sanford. Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011. p. 31.
29 BALKIN, J. M.; LEVINSON, Sanford. Constitutional Grammar. Texas Law Review, v. 72, p. 1771, 1993. p. 7.
30 BALKIN, J. M.; LEVINSON, Sanford. Constitutional Grammar. Texas Law Review, v. 72, p. 1771, 1993. p. 6–7.
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While it is certainly true that Professor Bobbitt’s description of the modalities of 
constitutional argument can be read as an attempt to define and differentiate constitu-
tional language from all other forms of language – such as political and moral language, 
for instance – and bestow legitimacy only on the first, Professor Bobbitt’s primary inter-
est in this construction is not allowing everyone to make constitutional arguments, but 
legitimating the arguments made by judges in interpreting the Constitution. This is not 
to say, of course, that Professor Bobbitt does not desire or recognize the importance of 
the usage of constitutional language by other actors in the polity. But so far as the locus 
of authority (and so the focal point of determining whether his approach is Catholic or 
Protestant in Levinson’s terms) is concerned, Bobbitt is clear in separating interpreta-
tions by judges from those made by everyone else.
Responding directly to Professors Levinson and Balkin, Professor Bobbitt differ-
entiates between constitutional discourse and constitutional argument, the latter being 
an activity confined to those persons whose decisions must be explained in terms of 
legal arguments, and the first being an activity that may include legal argument, but 
that is not confined by it31. For Bobbitt non-institutional interpretations of the Consti-
tution, even if they utilize constitutional language, are not decisions according to law. 
His entire framework of legitimacy and justification is concerned with the decisions of 
judges, with a system in which the Supreme Court has the final word on constitutional 
interpretation.
This differentiation is fundamental, for instance, in allowing Professor Bobbitt to 
account for the legitimacy of the six modalities of argument and only of those; for Bob-
bitt, these modalities are legitimated by practice, but not the practice of all the actors 
in the polity engaged in constitutional discourse (which would perhaps make neces-
sary to include new modalities which are quite common in constitutional debate, such 
as arguments based on morality or on natural law32). Instead the normative element 
that defines what constitutes constitutional arguments33 is their confinement to the 
described practices of judges who, in the exercise of judicial review, make such argu-
ments. These features of Professor Bobbitt’s work make clear that he does not question 
judicial supremacy as a source of constitutional interpretation.
A final note must be made to the role of conscience in Professor Bobbitt’s juris-
prudence. Conscience is a very important feature of Protestant religious tradition, as 
the utmost guide to an individual seeking to understand for himself the commands 
31  BOBBITT, Philip. Reflections Inspired by My Critics. Texas Law Review, v. 72, p. 1869, 1993.
32  BOBBITT, Philip. Reflections Inspired by My Critics. Texas Law Review, v. 72, p. 1869, 1993. p. 1923–1924.
33  Bobbitt observes that in selecting the six modalities “this normative element is not a legal matter, but comes 
from an anthropological, historical, and empirical assessment of what arguments appear to re-occur in legal 
texts and oral arguments.” BOBBITT, Philip. Reflections Inspired by My Critics. Texas Law Review, v. 72, p. 1869, 
1993. p. 1922.
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of God in the sacred text. Conscience became a necessary tool to provide guidance to 
those who no longer had the Church telling them what the Bible meant. This ideology, 
at once liberating and indeterminate, plays a fundamental role in Professor Levinson’s 
distinction in the realm of constitutional law. To him, interpretative Protestantism is a 
way to preserve conscience against authority34. 
Professor Bobbitt’s role for conscience in interpretation is, however, somewhat 
distinct. The role of conscience in traditional Protestant thought – and in Professor 
Levinson’s analogical of interpretative Protestantism – is quite large and significant; 
conscience replaces doctrine, to a large extent. It is the guide that orients those who 
seek to interpret the sacred text, or the Constitution, observing only the text itself. It al-
lows every man to form his own mind about what the Constitution means. In Professor 
Bobbitt’s work, conscience is the last resort in a long and complex system of interpre-
tative sources, in which the six modalities of argument are available for consultation 
– text, history, structure, precedent, prudence, ethos; these modalities will often offer 
conflicting solutions, within themselves (when historical argument, for instance, can 
be made to support two different claims, depending on the historical source the inter-
preter is utilizing, or when prudential argument supports two different interpretations 
because there is doubt on what the best economic and political consequences are) and 
amongst each other. In each case, Professor Bobbitt offers the interpreter guidance as 
to how to proceed. In the first case, when there is conflict within a modality, the rules of 
constitutional argument themselves will help to determine which is the best possible 
argument that modality can provide. In the second case, when the modalities conflict, 
Professor Bobbitt recognizes a role for conscience35.
For conscience, which is manifest only when the modalities conflict, Professor 
Bobbitt reserves the role of justice in the system of judicial review. For him justice is a 
changing, evolving matter; in this sense, one can only justify a system of judicial review 
by certain standards in a certain point in time. The traditional approach to justifica-
tion, that would adopt a certain concept of justice and then apply it to the results of 
constitutional decision-making, could therefore only achieve ephemeral results (what 
has made Roberto Unger, as quoted by Professor Bobbitt, say that “...they could not be 
made coherent without freezing into place”36). For Bobbitt, a system of judicial review 
can only be consistently and continually justified by the role of conscience. Conscience, 
as applied to hard cases, allows for a just system even if it does not always provide just 
34  This analysis of the role of conscience in Levinson’s work is explained in its clearer terms by Professor Balkin 
in BALKIN, Jack M. Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2011. p. 95–96.
35  BOBBITT, Philip C. Constitutional Interpretation. Cambridge: Blackwell Pub, 1991.  p. 112–170.
36  See UNGER, Roberto Mangabeira. The Critical Legal Studies Movement: Another Time, A Greater Task. 
London: Verso, 2015.
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decisions because it recognizes the indeterminacy of justice. Unless all could be per-
suaded to accept a single theory or conception of justice – something unlikely in the 
theoretical, and virtually impossible in the practical – society will never agree on what 
is just.
Understanding justice and rightness to be independent from the achievement 
of truth that is unique and universally applicable is also a trait of Protestantism. But it 
does not make Professor Bobbitt a constitutional protestant in any of the two variables 
proposed by Levinson in Constitutional Faith. He believes that doctrine (or unwritten 
traditions) are just as authoritative sources of interpretation as the text itself, recogniz-
ing no hierarchy within the modalities of argument. And he does not challenge judicial 
supremacy in constitutional interpretation, so far as he sees only judges to be bound 
by restrains of constitutional argument and charged with the duty of exercising con-
science in face of hard decisions, allowing for a interpretative system that is legitimate 
and just.
3.2. Amar as an interpretative catholic: America’s unwritten Constitu-
tion
The publishing America’s Unwritten Constitution alongside America’s Constitu-
tion: a Biography seems to raise questions on the classification of Professor Amar as an 
interpretative Protestant, at least in relation to the first variable proposed by Levinson. 
After all, isn’t the definition of an interpretative catholic in regards to the substantive 
source of interpretative legitimacy someone who recognizes both the written text and 
unwritten traditions? So far as Catholicism and Protestantism are understood as ideal 
types, not quite. Levinson places due emphasis in the Catholic convention of placing 
independent authority in oral tradition, which was understood to be in coequal status 
with scripture37.
It is not just that Professor Amar has recognized his belief in the importance of 
being a documentarian first and a doctrinalist second – whereas that might be enough 
to classify him as a Catholic of the first variety. In the introduction to America’s Unwrit-
ten Constitution, he asks “How can Americans be faithful to a written Constitution even 
as we venture beyond it? What is the proper relationship between the document and 
the doctrine – that is, between the written Constitution and the vast set of judicial rul-
ings purporting to apply the Constitution?”38 and almost immediately observes that 
“… the written Constitution itself invites recourse to certain things outside the text – 
things that form America’s unwritten Constitution. When viewed properly, America’s 
37  LEVINSON, Sanford, Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011. p. 18.
38  AMAR, Akhil Reed. America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By, Reprint 
edition. [s.l.]: Basic Books, 2015. p. x.
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unwritten Constitution supports and supplements the written Constitution without 
supplanting it.”39
He goes on to describe the invitation contained in the Ninth Amendment to find 
rights that are not textually enumerated, as an example of the written text authorizing 
the exploration of the unwritten realm in search of its proper and full meaning. While 
getting ready to explore the unwritten features of the Constitution, he recognizes that 
precedents may be overruled and unwritten customs may ebb away, but “the written 
Constitution itself operates on a higher legal plane, and a clear constitutional command 
may not as a rule be trumped by a mere case, statue, or custom.”40 Therefore, Professor 
Amar willingness to explore the unwritten Constitution – even his belief that such ex-
ploitation is necessary to unveil the true meaning of certain Constitutional provisions 
– causes him to recognize neither the independent authority of unwritten traditions nor 
its equal status to the written Constitution.
Can, however, Professor Amar be as easily recognized as a Protestant of the sec-
ond variety? In his work, he does not reject the authority of the Supreme Court, nor 
does he offer express appreciation for other sources of interpretative authority. But the 
intense and heartfelt defense of his own interpretations all throughout it, his belief in 
their authority as they are derived from the text and his direct correlates – history and 
structure – are significant in understanding his approach to authority and legitimacy. 
Just as Frederick Douglass described by Levinson, Amar is willing to recognize the le-
gitimacy of his interpretations despite the Supreme Court – against the Supreme Court.
This approach is remarkably similar to the system envisioned by Professor Jack 
Balkin in Living Originalism41. In preaching fidelity to text and principle in his frame-
work originalism, Professor Balkin is not only advising observance to text before and 
above construction. He is also advocating that Protestantism in its second variety allows 
for the continuance and legitimacy of the system, because people who hold different 
views about what the constitutional text means can see their own interpretations as 
legitimate and hope to redeem their views in the future. According to Balkin:
When political and social movements succeed in persuading other citizens that their 
interpretation is the right one, they replace an older set of implementing constructions 
and doctrines with a new one. These constructions and implementations may not be just 
or correct judged from the standpoint of later generations, and they can be challenged 
later on. But that is precisely the point. In every generation, We the People of the United 
39  AMAR, Akhil Reed. America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By, Reprint 
edition. [s.l.]: Basic Books, 2015. p. x–xi.
40  AMAR, Akhil Reed. America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By, Reprint 
edition. [s.l.]: Basic Books, 2015. p. xii.
41  BALKIN, Jack M., Living Originalism. [s.l.]: Belknap Press, 2014.
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States make the Constitution our own by calling upon its text and its principles and ar-
guing about what they mean in our own time. That is how every generation connects its 
values to the commitments of the past and carries forward the constitutional project of 
the American people in the future.42
While it cannot be affirmed from his work in America’s Constitution and America’s 
Unwritten Constitution that Professor Amar fully shares Balkin’s views on the role of con-
stitutional interpretation in redeeming democracy, it seems fair to reconcile his project 
with Balkin’s notion – borrowed from Levinson in Constitutional Faith43 – of the role of 
Protestant interpretation in constitutional redemption and the maintenance of consti-
tutional faith. By committing to his own project of constitutional interpretation, one 
that preaches fidelity to the text first and doctrine second, Professor Amar maintains 
deep belief in the legitimacy of his interpretations. This belief allows him to believe in 
the Constitution – in the political project it represents, in its ideals and principles, and in 
modern Americans’ abilities to vindicate them – even when the United States Supreme 
Court deviates completely from his own view.
4. FAITH IN THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COHERENCE OF PURIST 
THEORIES
Having explored the most important nuances that connect Professors Bobbitt 
and Amar’s works to the classifications of Levinson’s ideal types, I hope to be able now 
to investigate some of the consequences of the revealed distinctions in the author’s 
approaches to constitutional interpretation. My first point is about constitutional faith 
– since Professor Levinson’s work has been a recurring theme in this paper – and how 
these interpretative theories are different in their understanding of the Constitution 
and its legacy. My second point is about coherence, and it will explore how these inter-
pretative theories are similar, and speak a distinctively more comprehensible language 
than many of its counterparts. 
Faith is a main theme in Sanford Levinson’s jurisprudence, and as Professor 
Balkin has drown out44, his distinction between Catholic and Protestant approaches to 
interpretation directly relates to the idea of faith in the Constitution. Levinson strongly 
opposes the idea of constitutional idolatry, or the blind belief in the Constitution for 
being the Constitution, and regardless of the results in delivers. As he states:
42  BALKIN, Jack M., Living Originalism. [s.l.]: Belknap Press, 2014.p. 11.
43  BALKIN, Jack M., Living Originalism. [s.l.]: Belknap Press, 2014. p. 77. See also BALKIN, Jack M. Idolatry and 
Faith: The Jurisprudence of Sanford Levinson. Tulsa Law Review, v. 38, 2002.
44  BALKIN, Jack M. Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2011. p. 98.
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All this having been said, are the endings to all constitutional tales happy ones, and is 
the Constitution therefore necessarily worthy of respect, even from the interpreter who 
conscientiously follows the rule of charity in interpretation? The answer, alas, is no, un-
less one adopts the nominalist proposition that the Constitution is itself the source of all 
criteria of respect. In that case, as noted at the outset, the Constitution’s “worthiness of 
respect” is tautological and trivial.45
Levinson sees constitutional Protestantism as a way to avoid idolatry – for the 
individual who truly believes that the real Constitution is the one he sees, and not the 
one the Supreme Court sees, not to be obliged to nevertheless bow to the false Con-
stitution the Court proclaims. In this sense, we can grasp a fundamental difference be-
tween Protestant and Catholic approaches to constitutional interpretation. It was the 
distinction that allowed Levinson to overcome his doubts in signing the Constitution 
by remembering Frederick Douglass and his commitment to a Constitution that then 
could only be imagined46. But this distinction, I believe, deserves a more charitable ap-
proach that the one Professor Levinson hints to. 
It cannot be that all that is left to interpretative Catholicism is blindingly bow-
ing to false idols and idolatrizing a Constitution unworthy of respect. Naturally, this 
counter-conclusion derives in part from Professor Levinson’s dramatic emphasis on the 
dangers of idolatry. The reality of constitutional practice is certainly not one in which 
the Constitution is transformed by the Supreme Court into a document unworthy of 
respect that must be rejected over the penalty of empting the founding document of 
meaning and legitimacy. Good constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court, to 
the point that goodness can be measured over one’s standards of morality or political 
preferences, comes and goes throughout constitutional history. It is quite safe to affirm 
that interpretative Catholics feel just as bothered and affronted by decisions that derive 
from their views, not only personal but legal, on the realm of constitutional interpreta-
tion. So what can account for the differences in posture and attitude of these two strains 
of legal thought in the face of bad institutionalized constitutional interpretation?
The answer, I would say, is faith, but not the absence of faith, or better, mislead-
ing faith, that is suggested by Professor Levinson’s hypothetical. Rather, I would call 
the difference between Catholics and Protestants in this scenario one of placement of 
faith47. Protestants of the second variety, such as Frederick Douglass, Professor Amar 
and Professor Levinson himself legitimize and justify interpreting the Constitution by 
its results. What constitutes good results will of course mean different things to them, 
45  LEVINSON, Sanford, Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011. p. 87.
46  LEVINSON, Sanford, Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011.
47  I must also attribute this construction to Professor Balkin, who called it distribution of faith in a different 
scenario.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 3, n. 2, p. 33-50, maio/ago. 2016.
Ana Beatriz Vanzoff Robalinho Cavalcanti
48 
even because Levinson is a Catholic as to the source of legal authority. Let’s take Pro-
fessor Amar. He believes in the strength and legitimacy of the political pact that origi-
nated the Constitution and in its superior authority granted by ratification, but he also 
has faith in the constitutional project he understands the founders to have envisioned. 
To him the work of that generation is worth protecting above the work of following 
generations. The only way he can maintain faith in the Constitution is by believing in 
those results, in their legitimacy, even when the United States Supreme Court does no 
pronounce it or agrees with them.
Professor Bobbitt’s Catholicism, on the other hand, does not place its faith on 
results (or else, let’s say that would be unwise, as he cannot control how the Supreme 
Court will interpret the Constitution). Rather, his faith is in the process of constitutional 
decision-making. Professor Bobbitt is a pure interpretative Catholic. This means he be-
lieves in tradition in a way that Protestants do not; he sees equal legitimacy in the work 
of the generations that came after the founding, their recurring constitutional practic-
es, their precedents, and the work of original generation. This makes it difficult, makes 
it nearly impossible, to base one’s faith on the constitutional system in results, because 
the basis on which to determine whether the results are good is a moving target. Unlike 
text, history and structure, tradition evolves, changes course, is later rejected. It is unde-
termined, just like Professor Bobbitt’s conception of justice. This is why his approach to 
constitutional interpretation does not look at the justice of the results, but at the justice 
of the system, which is, for him, dependent upon its openness. He explains that:
The United States Constitution formalizes a role for the conscience of the individual sen-
sibility by requiring decisions that rely on the individual moral sensibility when the mo-
dalities of argument clash. We are tempted to think that, in a just system (a subject I will 
take up presently), we can presume that a particular outcome is just if there is no contra-
diction within the system. And most cases in the American system, despite the rhetoric of 
indeterminacy, are not deeply conflicted cases. When these conflicts occur, however, the 
system of constitutional interpretation proscribes a role for the individual conscience: it 
does not prescribe a particular outcome. Therefore, even if the system is just we may not 
presume that every outcome is just.48
The conclusion of this point is already leading into my second one, which is co-
herence. Professor Levinson suggested that there was no rational relation between the 
two variables of his proposed ideal types, and one could just as easily be Catholic on 
one variety and Protestant on the other as stay in the same side of spectrum on both 
varieties. But this is true neither in religion nor in law. While there may exist good in-
terpretative theories that are characterized as mixed typed within Levinson’s varieties, 
48  BOBBITT, Philip C. Constitutional Interpretation. Cambridge: Blackwell Pub, 1991. p. 168.
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his analogical is applicable to interpretative theories not only on the results of the divi-
sion between Catholics and Protestants, but also on the reasons for the fundamental 
differences in their approaches to the interpretation of the bible. In this sense there 
are sound and rational reasons why opting for one side of the spectrum in one variety 
should lead to staying in the same side of the spectrum on the other.
Levinson hints on several of these rational factors when describing the religious 
approaches to interpretation. He observes that Catholics’ perception of scripture as of-
ten “ambiguous and perplexing” has lead them to supplement it by unwritten tradition 
in order to reach certainty. And on that point he notes “there may be a special connec-
tion between the perception of an authoritative unwritten tradition and the need for 
a specific institutional authority that can articulate its claims”49. There is a fine balance 
between certainty and uncertainty in this system. Catholics opted to rely on unwritten 
traditions to escape the uncertainty of the text. But they chose to bestow upon unwrit-
ten traditions independent and equal authority. And traditions can be more undeter-
mined than any open text, because traditions (unlike texts) actually change and evolve. 
The only way to escape complete indeterminacy is to have a centralized inter-
pretative authority that will determine meaning applicable to all. The opposite is true 
of Protestantism. If there was a reason to reject unwritten traditions and focus on text, 
it was to escape the church as the central interpretative authority. Text, no matter how 
open ended, is fixed. It offers a clear guide to interpretation. By conferring interpreta-
tive authority to text alone, the need for a centralized institution to be the single inter-
preter is lesser (because there is less of a risk of complete indeterminacy). 
Indeterminacy in interpretation is inevitable, and it can be dealt with in differ-
ent ways. However, what I have been calling purist theories, like Professor Amar’s and 
Professor Bobbitt’s (the way I read them) seem to strike a better balance between inde-
terminacy in the object of interpretation and indeterminacy in the locus of authority of 
interpretation than its mixed counterparts.
5. CONCLUSION
The study of constitutional interpretation often offers too many variables to 
allow for intelligible comparative efforts. One must choose a standard on which to 
measure differences and similarities, and still account for all the discrepancies that re-
sult from the fact that no two academics propose to answer the same question in the 
same way. By utilizing Professor Levinson’s ideal types of constitutional interpretation, 
I hoped to highline the themes that stood out to me in Professors Amar and Bobbitt’s 
jurisprudences, and to show why I believe that – albeit from very different perspectives 
– they are engaged in a same project of constitutional redemption.
49  LEVINSON, Sanford, Constitutional Faith. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011. p. 21.
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